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CANADA’S INADEQUATE LEGAL PROTECTION 
AGAINST INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 
 
Emir Crowne* & Tasha De Freitas** 
 
ABSTRACT 
Canadian law provides little protection for individuals and corporations 
against industrial espionage. Akin to the United States’ Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996—with its broad definition of “trade secret” and accompanying 
protections and remedies—we propose that Canada enact legislation at the 
federal level to remedy many of the deficiencies that arise in bringing a claim 
under the usual breach of confidence action. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Canadian law provides little protection for individuals and corporations 
against the very real threat and damage of industrial espionage. What is required 
is a federal law that captures both the actions of individual wrongdoers and of 
the corporations or companies that induced these individuals to commit those 
acts. A federal criminal law with heavy penalties would help balance the power 
differential in cases of a mammoth corporation preying upon a small company 
and would help provide the necessary deterrence that current Canadian law 
lacks. By protecting confidential information, particularly trade secrets, not only 
would Canada send a strong message to those tempted to participate in industrial 
espionage, but Canada would finally begin to live up to its international 
obligations to provide ample protection of intellectual property. The United 
States’ Economic Espionage Act of 19961 and the extensive protection it 
provides for proprietary confidential information, by virtue of its broad 
definition of a “trade secret,” addresses many of the Canadian judiciary’s 
concerns relating to the criminalization of the theft of confidential information. 
A criminal law would also overcome many of the problems inherent in the use 
of tort law, which provides the primary protection of confidential information 
under Canadian law. 
This Article examines the little protection current Canadian law provides 
against industrial espionage and how implementing something akin to the 
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United States’ Economic Espionage Act of 1996 would prove beneficial to 
Canada. Part I provides background information about industrial espionage. 
Next, Part II discusses Canadian law and how it fails to adequately protect 
against the threat of industrial espionage. Part III then examines steps the United 
States has taken to combat industrial espionage. Finally, Part IV discusses 
Canada’s international obligation to afford better protection to those vulnerable 
to industrial espionage. 
I. BACKGROUND: INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE EXPLAINED 
Industrial espionage, defined as one company spying on another to steal 
trade secrets or other proprietary information,2 has a tremendous impact on the 
Canadian economy. Examples of proprietary information include: client lists, 
internal pricing schemes, investment strategies, technical schematics, blueprints, 
source code, and contract bid submission/tenders.3 There is not a single statutory 
or common law definition of a “trade secret,” but article 1711 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the 
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States4 provides a 
generally accepted definition of a “trade secret.” For the purposes of this paper, 
trade secrets will be treated as a subset of confidential information, and 
“confidential information” will also include information that relates to non-
technical matters such as business plans or pricing information.5 
Industrial espionage can take place in a variety of circumstances and 
occurs for many different reasons. Apart from searching through a competitor’s 
garbage and electronically accessing or compiling a competitor’s secrets, 
confidential information may be exposed and obtained in the course of mergers 
and acquisitions, joint ventures and alliances, licensing relationships, and 
employment relationships, as well as through the use of consultants and 
advisors.6 Acquiring the confidential information of a competitor can enable the 
perpetrator to undercut their competition by giving them a head start they would 
  
 2 Industrial Espionage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (8th ed. 2004). 
 3 Oxana Iatsyk & Shelagh Carnegie, Knowing Your Enemy – Managing External 
Forces, Address at the Ontario Bar Association 2006 Institute of Continuing Legal 
Education: Corporate Counsel: Keeping Secrets Secret – Battling Industrial Espionage 
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 4 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1711(1)(a), Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
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not have had but for the unauthorized use of the confidential information. This 
activity is also known as “spring-boarding.”7 Industrial espionage can also be 
conducted for personal profit. Information brokers are contractors who scour the 
world for proprietary information, using both legal and illegal means, and sell 
such information to interested clients.8 
Although exact dollar figures are difficult to determine, in 1996 the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) estimated the cost of industrial 
espionage to be approximately $1 billion per month CDN, and, as of 2006, that 
figure has likely increased due to improvements in communications technology 
and the increasingly global nature of the Canadian economy.9 
II. ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN LEGAL APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE 
This section examines how criminal law and tort law in Canada deal with 
industrial espionage. In analyzing those sources of law, we conclude that each 
fails to adequately protect individuals and corporations against industrial 
espionage. 
A. Canadian Criminal Law: Current Law and Analysis 
The Canadian Criminal Code affords victims of industrial espionage little 
protection. Strangely, the courts have prohibited the application of provisions 
like theft and fraud, which would appear to capture the nature of the act. The 
few provisions that could be used to prosecute the unauthorized taking of 
confidential information, such as the unauthorized use of a computer (section 
342.110), are so limited in scope that, at best, they would only capture the 
activities of the individual actors and not the companies or corporations that may 
have induced them to commit such crimes. 
In R. v. Stewart, the court found that the theft provisions in the Criminal 
Code could not apply to the unauthorized taking of confidential information 
itself because: (i) confidential information was not property under section 
322(1);11 (ii) confidentiality in and of itself does not impart an interest of which 
  
 7 Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 491, para. 67 (Can.) 
(WL); see also Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders’ Supply Co. (Hayes), [1967] R.P.C. 375, 371 
(Eng.); Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng’rs.) Ltd., [1968] F.S.R. 415, 421 (Ch. D.) (WL). 
 8 OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2005 (Aug. 2006), 
available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/FECIE_2005.pdf. 
 9 Andrew Jones, Industrial Espionage in a Hi-Tech World, 2008 COMPUTER FRAUD 
AND SECURITY 7, (Jan. 2008) (citing Derek Quinn, Industrial Espionage, RADIO CAN. 
INT’L (Sept. 5, 2006)). 
 10 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 342.1 (Can.). 
 11 Id. s. 322(1); R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, para. 33 (Can.). 
 





the owner or source of the information could be deprived;12 (iii) there is not a 
precise definition of the term “confidential information”;13 and (iv) finding that 
confidential information is property may have far reaching ramifications.14 In 
light of these concerns, the court held that it was not the place of the judiciary to 
make a finding that confidential information is property under the Criminal 
Code and deferred to Parliament to make such a determination.15 
According to the court, the subject of the theft must be something capable 
of ownership.16 It must be property “capable of being taken or converted in a 
manner that results in the deprivation of the victim.”17 The court reasoned that in 
order for something to be stolen, it must belong to someone and “one cannot be 
deprived of confidentiality, because one cannot own confidentiality.”18 As an 
intangible, information could only qualify under the provision if it was capable 
of being converted.19 Because conversion requires the act of interference, it must 
deprive the owner of the use and possession of the chattel, and, in the case of 
confidential information, because the alleged owner is not deprived of the 
information in this sense, it cannot be the subject of theft.20 While confidentiality 
may impart some value to the information, the court found that this did not merit 
conferring a special property or interest in it to anyone.21 
The court also found that deeming confidential information property 
under the Criminal Code would have far-reaching implications.22 The criminal 
law is designed to prevent wrongs against society as a whole.23 In situations in 
which society might benefit from the public release or greater accessibility to 
such information, the court found that characterizing confidential information as 
property would likely undermine this purpose.24 If confidential information was 
considered property under the Criminal Code, it may capture “innocent” activity 
and indirectly restrict the movement of labor.25 It may also unexpectedly trigger 
criminal responsibility.26 The court reasoned that a person having committed 
“theft” of confidential information might be charged under other provisions of 
  
 12 Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 at para. 38. 
 13 Id. at para. 31. 
 14 Id. at para. 30. 
 15 See id. at para. 33. 
 16 Id. at para. 21. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at para. 37. 
 19 Id. at para. 34. 
 20 Id. at para. 35. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See id. at paras. 28–32. 
 23 Id. at para. 28. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at paras. 29–30. 
 26 See id. at para. 27. 
 




the Criminal Code for acts they might not have any control over.27 For example, 
if a person could not forget the information, they could be prosecuted under 
section 354 (possession of property obtained by crime). Despite these 
drawbacks, we propose that confidential information should be—and already 
is—covered under the Criminal Code.28 
Confidential information should qualify under the theft provisions of the 
Criminal Code. Section 322 allows the subject of theft to be “anything.”29 If 
Parliament wanted to restrict the definition of “anything” to cover only property, 
then it likely would have defined this in the legislation. Even if the subject of 
theft must be property, confidential information has the key characteristic of 
property—it is capable of being owned. Ownership of confidential information, 
like patents and other recognized forms of intellectual property, is about the use 
of ideas to the exclusion of others unless permitted by the owner or originator of 
the information.30 The value of confidential information resides, at least 
partially, in the ability of the owner to control how, when, and to whom such 
information is released, and this value must be recognized by the courts. It is 
also important to note that section 322 does not require that the interest be 
proprietary, but merely special.31 Why would the economic interest derived from 
the value of the confidentiality of the information not suffice? 
A finding that confidential information is property under the Criminal 
Code would be in keeping with one of the primary goals of Canadian criminal 
law—to benefit society as a whole. Under Canadian patent law, patent 
protection of an idea arises when the patent application is filed, but the 
development of the idea usually takes place well in advance of that application. 
In order to obtain a patent, the idea must be novel, and this novelty is based on 
the invention’s similarity to those claimed in prior filed applications.32 If Party A 
is able to obtain critical design or test data ahead of Party B, but Party B acquires 
Party A’s design or test data and files an application first, Party B will gain 
patent protection to the detriment of Party A. Another critical issue arises when a 
competitor obtains a confidential list of investors and uses that list to interfere 
with funding crucial to the development of another party’s idea. If competitors 
are allowed to interfere in the crucial development stages of projects that may 
have led to great benefit for society as a whole (e.g., medicines), then there is 
little incentive for scientists and inventors to pursue such noble causes. 
Therefore, providing protection for confidential information as property under 
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 28 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 354 (Can.); Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 at 
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 30 See generally Endplex Invs. v. Derrydale Golf Course Ltd., 2008 CanLII 49330 
(Can. Ont. S.C.). 
 31 Criminal Code s. 322(1)(a). 
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the Criminal Code would encourage scientists and inventors to pursue such 
ideas with confidence that their ideas and information is protected. 
Similarly, the court in Stewart found that it was unlikely that the taking of 
confidential information would qualify as fraud.33 Based on findings that 
confidential information was not property, the court found that the necessary 
element of deprivation could not be met.34 As the hotel was not defrauded of any 
money or economic advantage and only stood to lose the information’s 
confidentiality, it had not and would not likely suffer any prejudice to its 
economic interests.35 This finding does seem to take into account the reason why 
the hotel wanted to keep the information (names of its employees) confidential. 
The defendant wanted to obtain the information in order to unionize the hotel’s 
employees.36 Unionizing would have likely meant the hotel would have to 
increase the benefits it granted to its employees and possibly make it more 
difficult for it to negotiate lower cost employment arrangements.37 Are these 
concerns not “economic interests?” The main reasons for committing industrial 
espionage are economic interests including gaining a competitive economic 
advantage, which, by its very nature, leads to the victim’s detriment. 
As previously discussed, other criminal provisions, such as sections 342.1 
(unauthorized use of a computer) and 430(1.1) (data mischief) would only 
capture specific types of industrial espionage.38 If the acts do not involve 
computer devices (such as searching through a competitor’s trash) then section 
342.1 may not apply. Acts captured under section 430(1.1) focus on denying 
access to or destroying data (defined as “representations of information or of 
concepts that are being prepared or have been prepared in a form suitable for use 
in a computer system,”39 which may include confidential information). This 
provision would not cover instances in which someone only copied the data or 
confidential information. 
The mobility of labor is unlikely to be affected by deeming confidential 
information as property under the Criminal Code. Restrictive covenants in 
employment contracts that attempt to stop former employees from releasing or 
using confidential information during- subsequent employment have been 
upheld by the courts.40 Additionally, it is unlikely that an employee unable to 
forget the confidential information, through no fault of their own, would have 
the requisite intent to support a conviction under section 354 of the Criminal 
  
 33 R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, paras. 47–48 (Can.). 
 34 Id. at para. 35. 
 35 See id. at para. 37. 
 36 Id. at para. 2. 
 37 See Facts About Unions, UFCW CANADA, http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=29&Itemid=49&lang=en (last visited Dec. 7, 2013). 
 38 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 342.1, 430(1.1) (Can.). 
 39 Id. s. 342.1(2). 
 40 See Jiffy Foods Ltd. v. Chomski, [1973] 3 O.R. 955 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
 




Code. This provision requires that the individual has the intention to possess the 
subject-matter of the charge as well as specific knowledge of its spurious 
character.41 It is unlikely that inadvertent memory of the confidential 
information would meet this scienter requirement. 
The court’s concern over a lack of a precise definition for the term 
“confidential information” is likely no longer justified in light of Pharand Ski 
Corp. v. Alberta.42 A precise definition is not necessary in order for the court to 
make a determination of whether information is confidential. As will be 
discussed later in this paper, the court has established a set of factors to aid in 
this determination.43 Using factors to determine whether an individual has 
committed a criminal offense would not be unique to confidential information. 
Section 467.11(3) of the Criminal Code provides factors for the court to 
consider when determining if “an accused participates in or contributes to any 
activity of a criminal organization.”44 
In sum, confidential information should be deemed property under the 
Criminal Code to provide protection to individuals’ ideas and projects where 
protection afforded by other areas of law falls short. Protection of confidential 
information falls in line with the overarching goal of furthering the public good 
and does not interfere with current Canadian case law or statutory law. 
B. Canadian Tort Law 
Similar to Canadian criminal law, Canadian tort law also does not provide 
adequate protection for those who fall victim to industrial espionage. Because 
the cause of action is based on common law, courts have been slow to adapt to 
the evolving nature of industrial espionage. This section examines current tort 
law and the elements of a cause of action, and it discusses the shortcomings in 
tort law as it relates to the protection of confidential information and the victims 
of industrial espionage. 
1. Current Tort Law 
As discussed above, criminal law is usually inapplicable to cases of 
industrial espionage; therefore, the primary recourse for victims is through tort 
law. The dominant cause of action is breach of confidence, but in some cases 
victims have also attempted to recover their losses by claiming a breach of 
  
 41 TREMEEAR’S ANNOTATED CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA (Carswell 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
 42 See generally Pharand Ski Corp. v. Alberta (1991), 80 Alta. L.R. 2d 216 (Can. 
Alta. Q.B.). 
 43 See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 44 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 467.11(3) (Can.). 
 





fiduciary duty (in equity).45 Because the moving party bears the burden to prove 
each element of the cause of action, use of tort law as the primary legal recourse 
for victims makes it likely that many instances of industrial espionage go 
unanswered by the court.46 As a result, there is little deterrence for wrongdoers 
as long as they choose their victims wisely. As the court held in Lac Minerals 
Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., breach of confidence is a sui 
generis cause of action in which plaintiffs can apply for relief on the basis of 
contract, property and equity.47 An action for breach of confidence is rooted in 
the relationship between the two parties48 and is not meant to protect or place a 
value on the confidential information itself. It is, instead, meant to protect the 
relationship between the parties, regardless of how direct or indirect that 
relationship may be.49 Because the focus is the relationship between the parties, 
there may be instances where defendants have been able to avoid liability purely 
on the basis of an insufficient relationship between the parties and without 
regard to the damage and the confidential nature of the information. 
2. Analysis of Tort Law 
Under tort law, unauthorized disclosure or use of trade secrets can be 
brought under a cause of action for breach of confidence. There are three 
elements to a breach of confidence.50 First, the information must be 
confidential.51 Second, the information must have been imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.52 Third, there must have 
been an unauthorized use of the information by the party to whom it was 
communicated (the “confidee”) to the detriment of the party communicating it.53 
These three elements are discussed below. 
  
 45 See, e.g., R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, para. 24 (Can.); Lac Minerals Ltd. v. 
Int’l Corona Res., [1990] F.S.R. 441, 482 (Can.) (WL). 
 46 See generally Lac Minerals, [1990] F.S.R. 441. 
 47 Id. at 495. 
 48 Fan, supra note 5. 
 49 See Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 at para. 24 (protections in tort granted to 
confidential information are primarily concerned with the obligations of good faith or 
fiduciary relationships between the parties). 
 50 PETER NEUMANN & JEFFREY SACK, ETEXT ON WRONGFUL DISMISSAL AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.3.1 (1st ed. 2013). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 




a. Element 1: The Information Must Be Confidential 
In Pharand Ski, the court provided six factors to determine whether the 
information in question has the necessary qualities of confidence.54 These factors 
include: (i) the extent to which the information is known outside the owner’s 
business; (ii) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved 
in the owner’s business; (iii) the extent of measures taken by the plaintiff to 
guard the secrecy of the information; (iv) the value of the information to the 
plaintiff and his/her competitors; (v) the amount of money or effort expended by 
the plaintiff in developing the information; and (vi) the ease or difficulty with 
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others (i.e., 
through their independent endeavors).55 However, these factors need not be 
applied in order to find that the information was confidential if the court has 
found that the information was used by the defendant for the purpose of spring-
boarding.56 The factors in Pharand Ski are not exhaustive and the weight given 
to each one is completely at the discretion of the court.57 Whether information is 
deemed confidential will depend on the facts in each particular case.58 In 
determining whether these factors have been met, the courts appear to place 
significant weight on the information’s novelty or “originality,” the plaintiff’s 
control over access to the information, and the documentary evidence the 
plaintiff is able to adduce on his own behalf. Remarkably, the reason why the 
plaintiff attempted to keep the information confidential did not seem to be a 
great consideration for the Pharand Ski court.59 
Information that is public property or public knowledge is less likely to be 
considered confidential.60 However, if the plaintiff has taken sufficient measures 
to restrict access to or limit knowledge of such information outside of the 
plaintiff’s business, or the information itself has a “significant element of 
originality not already in the realm of public knowledge . . . . [as in] a significant 
twist or slant to a well-known concept,”61 the court may find that the information 
had the requisite quality of confidence. For example, in Interfirm Comparison 
  
 54 Pharand Ski Corp. v. Alberta (1991), 80 Alta. L.R. 2d 216, para. 136 (Can. Alta. 
Q.B.). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Stenada Mktg Ltd. v. Nazareno, 1990 CanLII 917 (B.C. S.C.). 
 57 Pharand Ski, 80 Alta. L.R. 2d 216 at para. 136. 
 58 Re Gauntlet Energy Corp., 2003 ABQB 718, para. 45 (Can. Alta. Q.B.). 
 59 See, e.g., Pharand Ski, 80 Alta. L.R. 2d 216 at para. 145 (finding information 
confidential without analyzing plaintiff’s reason for keeping the information 
confidential); Stenada Mktg., 1990 CanLII 917 (analyzing alleged confidential 
information without regard to plaintiff’s reasons for keeping information confidential). 
 60 Saltman Eng’g Co. v. Campbell Eng’g Co., [1963] 3 All E.R. 413, 415 (Eng.) 
(QL). 
 61 Fraser v. Thames Television Ltd. (1982), [1984] Q.B. 44, 66 (Eng.). 
 





(Australia) Party Ltd. v. Law Society of New South Wales,62 the court found that 
restricting access only to those individuals whom had requested the information 
and registered with the plaintiff ensured that the information was only known to 
a small group of individuals outside of the plaintiff’s business, providing it with 
a character of confidence.63 Further, in terms of the information’s novelty or 
“originality,” in Di Giacomo v. Di Giacomo Canada,64 although the constituent 
elements of the process at issue were commonly known, the ingenuity of the 
process was critical in the court’s finding that it had the requisite character of 
confidence.65 In contrast, a lack of originality defeated the plaintiff’s case in 
Promotivate International Inc. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.66 Despite 
finding that the disclosure of the plaintiff’s idea to the defendants was made in 
confidence, because the plaintiff’s idea was not, in the court’s opinion, wholly 
original in that essential elements were well-known, the plaintiff’s claim was 
defeated.67 
The manner in which the information is disclosed and the plaintiff’s 
control over access to this information also appears to have a significant bearing 
on the court’s determination of the information’s confidentiality, particularly in 
regard to the third factor. In evaluating the sufficiency of these measures, the 
court applies the reasonable person standard,68 and appears to focus on the 
consistency of the application of the measures, the quality of documentary 
evidence, and the clarity of the instructions for confidentiality. Inconsistent 
application of measures to limit access and group exposure to the information at 
issue, lack of documentary evidence and vague instructions to employees 
significantly undermined the plaintiff’s case in Yates Circuit Foil Co. v. 
Electrofoils Ltd.69 The court found that the plaintiff had frequently allowed 
“workmen, sub-contractors and customers [to be] shown the plant quite freely 
with no reservations as to secrecy” except in limited circumstances.70 Although 
the plaintiff insisted that he gave all the branch managers instructions to use 
extreme care when showing visitors around his plants, the plaintiff was not able 
to adduce sufficient documentary evidence of these instructions or practices, 
  
 62 Interfirm Comparison (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of N.S.W. (1975), 45 F.L.R. 
21 (S.C. N.S.W.) (WL). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Di Giacomo v. Di Giacomo Canada, 1989 CarswellOnt 2336 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.) 
(WL). 
 65 Id. at para. 107. 
 66 Promotivate Int’l Inc. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., 1985 CanLII 1995 (Can. 
Ont. S.C.). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Matrox Elec. Sys. Ltd. v. Gaudreau, [1993] Q.J. No. 1228, para. 99 (Can. Q. S.C.) 
(QL). 
 69 See generally Yates Circuit Foil Co. v. Electrofoils Ltd. (1975), [1976] F.S.R. 345 
(U.K.) (WL). 
 70 Id. at 376. 
 




which would have indicated a strong policy to maintain confidentiality.71 What 
documentation the plaintiff could adduce was deemed by the court as too vague 
because it did not give clear directions on what could and could not be discussed 
or what was confidential.72 The court found that this left too much discretion for 
the person receiving these instructions to be effective.73 As a result, only the 
information that the plaintiff was able to adduce sufficient documentary 
evidence for was deemed confidential.74 In contrast, in Matrox Electronics 
Systems Inc., the fact that every employee and visitor was given clear 
instructions regarding confidentiality, including employee confidentiality 
agreements, and that the plaintiff maintained a high level of control over where 
visitors and employees could travel on the plaintiff’s premises were key in the 
court’s finding that the information had the requisite quality of confidentiality.75 
Although the court found it was not necessary for an employee to be expressly 
advised on each and every occasion that information being disclosed to him or 
her was confidential, given the overwhelming evidence of the security measures 
taken by the plaintiff to control access to the information and to ensure that 
knowledge of the information outside of the plaintiff’s business was limited, the 
court found that a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the recipient of 
such information would have realized upon reasonable grounds that it was being 
disclosed in confidence.76 
Given the holdings in the above-mentioned cases, it is apparent that tort 
law is an inappropriate method for fighting and deterring industrial espionage, 
particularly in cases where there is a great differential in power and resources 
between the parties. As it can be appreciated, proving a breach in confidence is a 
considerable effort. Because the onus is on the plaintiff to prove on a balance of 
probabilities each element of the tort, it is likely that many instances of 
industrial espionage go unchecked. Whether a perpetrator of the breach is found 
liable is not based on the confidential information at stake, but rather it appears 
to be a matter of resources and whether the plaintiff has suffered serious 
financial damage. This makes it likely that the plaintiff will not have the 
resources necessary to adduce sufficient evidence to meet the burden of proof. 
Even if the plaintiff does meet his or her burden, the awarded damages are likely 
to be inadequate because they will not account for the value of the loss of 
confidentiality, but instead will only restore the plaintiff to the position he or she 
  
 71 Id. at 346. 
 72 Id. at 380. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. at 371. 
 75 Matrox Elec. Sys. Ltd. v. Gaudreau, [1993] Q.J. No. 1228, paras 98–99 (Can. Que. 
S.C.) (QL). 
 76 Id. at para. 99. 
 





would have occupied “but-for” the breach.77 This policy objective may make 
application of tort law to a situation of industrial espionage inappropriate. 
b. Element 2: The Information Must Have Been Imparted in Circumstances 
Importing an Obligation of Confidence 
An obligation of confidence can arise through contract or equity. In 
contract, an obligation of confidence may arise through employment, through a 
joint venture or partnership, and through a licensor-licensee relationship.78 In 
equity, depending on the nature of the relationship between the parties, an 
obligation of confidence may arise as a result of the circumstances surrounding 
the imparting of the information viewed from the perspective of the reasonable 
person.79 Less frequently, an obligation of confidence may result from a finding 
of a fiduciary relationship between the parties.80 If a plaintiff is unlikely to 
succeed in proving a breach of confidence, a finding of a fiduciary relationship 
would be favorable to the plaintiff because the plaintiff need not have suffered a 
detriment in order to establish a breach of fiduciary duty.81 In equity, a third 
party in possession of confidential information may be found liable for breach of 
confidence if there was either express or implied knowledge of the information’s 
confidentiality.82 
The court in Faccenda Chicken Ltd. v. Fowler provided a set of principles 
to consider in determining whether an employee was under an obligation of 
confidence. These principles borrow from both contract and equity. These 
considerations include: (i) any express terms or obligations in the employment 
contract itself; (ii) whether there are any implied terms or obligations that would 
impute confidentiality; (iii) the duty of good faith or fidelity of the employee 
during the course of his or her employment; and (iv) additional factors to 
determine whether any particular information falls within an implied term of the 
contract.83 These additional factors include: (i) the nature of the employee’s 
employment; (ii) the nature of the information itself (whether or not the 
information can be classified as a trade secret or requires the level of protection 
of a trade secret); (iii) whether the employer impressed upon the employee the 
confidentiality of the information (not only in words but in attitude towards the 
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information); and (iv) whether the relevant information could be easily isolated 
from other information the employee is allowed to disclose.84 These factors are 
to be applied using a “reasonableness” standard.85 
Situations of joint ventures, partnerships, and licensor-licensee 
relationships are restrictive. In any of these cases, duties and obligations of 
confidentiality must be found in the contract itself. The presence of an express 
provision of confidentiality in the joint venture contract may be sufficient for the 
court to find that the information at issue was communicated in circumstances 
importing an obligation of confidence.86 In contrast, in Chicago Blower Corp. v. 
141209 Canada Ltd.,87 the lack of an explicit duty in the licensing agreement 
between the parties to keep the information confidential not only during, but 
also after the term of the agreement expired, was critical to the court’s finding 
that the obligation of confidence of the defendant with respect to the information 
at issue ended after the licensing agreement expired.88 To alleviate the harshness 
of this principle, the court may still find an obligation of confidence to exist in a 
licensing agreement if the plaintiff did not anticipate that his know-how, 
imparted in confidence, would be used against him after the agreement 
expired.89 Where an express agreement is absent, the court may also find an 
implied obligation of confidentiality in the course of negotiations regarding a 
joint venture between the parties,90 and a defendant may be found in breach of 
this obligation if he later uses the confidential information discovered during the 
negotiation process as a spring-board.91 
The use of equity to find an obligation of confidence is less certain, 
however. In order for the court to find that an obligation of confidence arose 
from the circumstances surrounding the imparting of the information, those 
circumstances must have been such that “any reasonable man standing in the 
shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon 
reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence.”92 
The court in Pharand Ski discussed general circumstances that would give rise 
to an obligation of confidence, including whether confidentiality was an express 
term of any agreements between the parties, whether there was any assurance of 
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confidentiality, whether there is custom in the field in which the information 
was disclosed, and whether the nature of any implied obligations following 
formed express agreements of confidentiality.93 In Matrox, the court found that 
the extensive security measures taken by the plaintiff, including employee 
confidentiality agreements and the inherent obligations of confidentiality of the 
defendants as engineers, were sufficient to give rise to an obligation of 
confidence on the basis of the reasonable person.94 There is very little in the way 
of a structured approach to the application of this test, limiting the ability of the 
plaintiff to predict whether a defendant had an obligation of confidence towards 
him. This is particularly true in situations that do not involve employment 
between the parties (i.e., rival corporations). 
There is no presumption of a fiduciary relationship between arms-length 
commercial entities95 but one may arise if one party places itself in a position of 
vulnerability by sharing confidential information.96 There are three elements 
required to prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship: (1) the fiduciary has 
scope for the exercise of some discretion or power; (2) the fiduciary can 
unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s 
legal or practical interests; and (3) the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or 
at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.97 It is possible for 
the court to find a fiduciary relationship without the presence of the first two 
elements, but vulnerability or dependency of the beneficiary is essential.98 
Although the court in Lac Minerals found that vulnerability or dependency was 
present in the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the fact that it 
was a commercial relationship entered into voluntarily and that the plaintiff had 
the ability to protect itself in contract was sufficient to conclude that there was 
not a fiduciary relationship between the parties.99 
A finding that the circumstances imparted an obligation of confidence, 
particularly in the employment context, may depend on whether the court 
classifies the information at issue as a trade secret.100 For example, in Faccenda 
Chicken, the court held that information will only be protected in this sense if it 
can be properly classed as a trade secret or as material that by nature would 
require the same protection.101 However, the court did not provide specific 
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guidelines to determine whether information could be classified as a trade secret, 
but did state that it may include secret manufacturing processes and information 
that is in limited circulation.102 
Scientific and technical information may not be classified as trade secrets 
by the court if this information is too close to “pure science” and, therefore, 
likely in the public domain and the “intellectual equipment” of the ex-
employee.103 The court will also consider the attitude of the employer towards 
the information104 in determining whether information will be classified as a 
trade secret. The court has not defined this quality and has not offered any 
guidance in terms of what kind of evidence would be required by a plaintiff to 
prove this characteristic. However, even if the court does find that the 
circumstances of the disclosure give rise to an obligation of confidence, the final 
element must still be proven (namely, unauthorized use of that information). 
c. Element 3: Unauthorized Use of the Information by the Party to Whom It 
Was Communicated to the Detriment of the Party Communicating It 
Information received in confidence by the defendant used for any purpose 
other than that for which it was conveyed which results in a detriment to the 
plaintiff will likely entitle the plaintiff to relief.105 Proof of both the misuse of 
the information and the detriment of its misuse are required to satisfy this 
element.106 In cases involving alleged spring-boarding, if the court is satisfied 
that the defendant would have likely discovered the information without the 
confidence of the plaintiff, then it may find that the defendant’s misuse of the 
information did not result in a detriment to the plaintiff.107 Proving misuse of 
confidential information may be more difficult if the information at issue is 
classified as business information. Plaintiffs may then have to rely on purely 
circumstantial evidence to prove their case on a balance of probabilities.108 This 
circumstantial evidence will then have to be weighed against the testimony of 
defendants who will likely deny everything.109 
  
 102 See id. (“In addition, the fact that the circulation of certain information is restricted 
to a limited number of individuals may throw light on the status of the information and its 
degree of confidentiality.”). 
 103 Matrox Elec. Sys. Ltd. v. Gaudreau, [1993] Q.J. No. 1228, para. 72 (Can. Que. 
S.C.) (QL). 
 104 Yates Circuit Foil Co. v. Electrofoils Ltd. (1975), [1976] F.S.R. 345, 370–80 
(U.K.). 
 105 See generally Abode Props. Ltd. v. Schickedanz Bros. Ltd., 1999 CanLII 19053 
(Can. Alta. Q.B.). 
 106 See id. at paras. 47–50. 
 107 See id. at paras. 48–51. 
 108 Matrox, [1993] Q.J. No. 1228 at para. 94. 
 109 Id. 
 





Because a plaintiff must wait until the defendant has misused the 
information to its detriment, a plaintiff could face the hardship of launching 
multiple causes of action based on the same breach. For example, if the 
defendant is a broker of confidential information, he may have shared that 
information with multiple parties over a long period of time. If that information 
has been passed onwards in various forms (i.e., from subcontractors to third 
parties, etc.), the plaintiff would have the onerous burden of proving each 
successive liability. Furthermore, it is also unlikely that a defendant who 
acquires confidential information has an immediate use for it. In this situation, a 
plaintiff would have to wait until the defendant actually misuses the information. 
Finally, if the damage from the initial breach is severe, a plaintiff may be 
financially unable to pursue legal action, thereby allowing the downstream 
recipients to escape liability as well. 
3. Punitive Damages in Tort Law 
Tort law’s damages principal—to restore the plaintiff to the position he 
would have occupied “but-for” the breach—is inappropriate to cases of 
industrial espionage. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are an exception to 
the rule in that they are not meant to compensate for injury caused, but rather 
they are meant to punish the wrongdoer and deter future bad behavior.110 
Considering the impact of industrial espionage on the Canadian economy, 
Canadian law should allow for a cause of action that provides clear protection 
for and deters misuse of confidential information through the punishment of 
offenders, regardless of the availability or desirability of punitive damage 
awards. 
III. THE UNITED STATES’ APPROACH 
Unlike Canada, the United States succeeded in passing legislation that 
would adequately protect those whose proprietary information is stolen.111 If 
Canada were to adopt the main features of the United States’ Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, it would solve many of the problems and concerns 
regarding misuse of confidential information. The first part of this section 
explains the basics of the Espionage Act. The second part of this section 
analyzes how implementing the key aspects of the Espionage Act would be 
beneficial for Canada in combating industrial espionage. 
A. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
The United States’ federal protection of confidential proprietary 
information is embedded in Title I of the Espionage Act, which was “enacted to 
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create a national scheme to protect United States’ proprietary economic 
information, [and to provide] for both criminal and civil penalties for the theft of 
trade secrets benefitting either a foreign government or a private entity.”112 It 
characterizes trade secrets as property capable of being owned.113 It also 
addresses many of the court’s concerns in Stewart as well many general 
concerns regarding tort action to combat industrial espionage. 
Section 1832 of the Espionage Act provides explicit protection against the 
theft of trade secrets.114 Activities such as appropriating, taking, carrying away, 
concealing, possessing, receiving, or duplicating trade secrets without 
authorization will likely violate this provision.115 This provision also prohibits 
conspiracies to steal protected information; therefore, the confidential 
information need not always have been taken for criminal charges to apply.116 
Further, receipt of confidential information by an independent third party is also 
enough.117 Because attempts to obtain protected information are also prohibited, 
a defendant need not be successful in order to attract prosecution under this 
provision.118 Therefore, the defendant would be held accountable for all the 
information they attempted to obtain in the breach and not just the information 
that could be attributed to a specific harm the victim has suffered. In turn, this 
reduces the necessity of having to revisit the breach in subsequent legal actions. 
Corporations are also subject to this provision and penalties for corporate 
offenders are specified.119 The ability provided in this Act for the United States’ 
government to assert jurisdiction over extra-territorial conduct likely enables 
prosecution of multinational corporations.120 
The Espionage Act uses a broad definition of a “trade secret” that 
encompasses many types of information a person or organization would want to 
keep confidential.121 The definition includes financial, business, and procedural 
information, as long as reasonable measures were taken to keep such 
information secret, and the information derives either actual or potential 
independent economic value.122 As affirmed by the court in United States v. 
Martin, both tangibles and intangibles are included within this definition of a 
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“trade secret.”123 Additionally, information does not lose its trade secret 
protection when it is the subject of a patent application because United States’ 
“patent laws do not mandate that once a patent application is filed and approved, 
the inventor must open his files and fully disclose all of the technical and 
financial information ever created on the invention.”124 Although the novelty or 
uniqueness of the information may inform the courts in determining whether 
something is a matter of general knowledge, skill, or experience, a novelty or 
inventiveness requirement will not be strictly imposed in order for material to be 
considered a trade secret.125 
B. Analysis of the Espionage Act 
The Espionage Act addresses many of the court’s concerns in Stewart and 
many general concerns regarding the use of tort law to combat industrial 
espionage.126 First, it will not likely hinder the movement of labor. The 
Espionage Act was designed to prevent employees (and their future employers) 
from taking advantage of confidential information that was gained, discovered, 
copied, or taken while employed elsewhere. It was not designed to “prohibit 
lawful competition such as the use of general skills or parallel development of a 
similar product.”127 Further, the high level of intent required to successfully 
convict a defendant ensures that accidental receipt, acquisition, or unintentional 
possession of a trade secret will not likely result in criminal penalties.128 The 
Espionage Act also does not prohibit whistleblowers or otherwise lawful 
activity.129 Because it is a federal criminal offense, the onus is on the 
government to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sought to 
acquire information which the defendant believed to be a trade secret, regardless 
of whether the information actually qualified as such”130 The vast resources of 
the federal government will likely reduce, if not eliminate, a power imbalance 
between a financially devastated victim and a wealthy corporate defendant. 
Moreover, because the provision also prohibits tempted use, a defendant would 
not have to actually use the information to the victim’s detriment in order to be 
prosecuted.131 Finally, this Act instructs courts to take the steps necessary and 
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appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of the information that is the subject 
of the proceeding.132 
IV. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
Canada’s international obligations demand greater protection of 
confidential information. Current Canadian law does not satisfy the 
requirements of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) for protecting valuable information. The first part of 
this section will explain both the NAFTA and TRIPs agreements. The second 
part of this section will argue that Canada needs to amend its laws in order to be 
in compliance with these international obligations. 
A. NAFTA and TRIPs Explained 
Both NAFTA and TRIPs133 require Canada to protect information that is 
“secret.”134 Article 1711 of NAFTA requires each member to “provide the legal 
means for any person to prevent trade secrets from being disclosed to, acquired 
by, or used by others without the consent of the person lawfully in control of the 
information in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.”135 A “trade 
secret” is broadly defined and likely includes any information held by a person, 
legal or otherwise, that has been kept reasonably secret, and which has or is 
likely to have commercial value.136 The TRIPs agreement uses the same 
parameters as NAFTA to define the type of information each member is to 
protect, characterizing this information as “undisclosed information” rather than 
a “trade secret.”137 Both agreements use language of ownership in describing the 
required treatment of this information, which suggests that confidential 
information could give rise to a proprietary interest.138 To be protected, such 
information would have to be capable of being “acquired” or “used” and in the 
lawful control of a person.139 Furthermore, because TRIPs provides that 
information that is lawfully within the control of both natural and legal persons 
will be protected, then corporations as legal persons will also likely be afforded 
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protection.140 TRIPs also takes into consideration the public’s interest in this 
undisclosed or confidential information where disclosure may be necessary to 
protect the public.141 Moreover, tort law may still play a role in protection of this 
information as a breach of confidence may be deemed a violation of this 
agreement.142 
B. How NAFTA and TRIPs Require Changes in Canadian Law 
Given the requirements previously laid out by NAFTA and TRIPs, it is 
apparent that Canada needs to change the way it combats industrial espionage. 
With both agreements requiring a legal mechanism to protect trade secrets, 
Canada should not rely on a patchwork of common law tort doctrines and 
judicial re-examination of its Criminal Code provisions for such protection. 
Indeed, Canada is legally required to do something more. Specific legislation is 
needed. In the absence of such legislation, courts should take note of Canada’s 
international obligations with respect to trade secrets, and interpret domestic law 
in light of those obligations going forward, as both NAFTA and TRIPs have 
been incorporated into Canadian domestic law.143 For instance, it may lead to 
Stewart being distinguishable or no longer considered good law in light of those 
obligations. 
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The problem of industrial espionage demands a better approach than what 
Canadian law currently provides. Although it is the predominant approach, tort 
law is likely not the most effective or the most appropriate method to combat 
industrial espionage. Placing the burden of proof—particularly in regard to 
breach of confidence—on a victim who has likely suffered serious financial 
damage probably limits the number of incidents of industrial espionage reaching 
the courts. This likely provides little deterrence for a wealthy corporation or 
savvy information broker to commit such acts. Given that the purpose of tort law 
is not to punish or deter, tort law, from a policy perspective, may not be the most 
appropriate approach to combat industrial espionage. 
As the Espionage Act, NAFTA, and TRIPs suggest, confidential 
information should give rise to a proprietary interest and this proprietary interest 
should be protected under Canadian criminal law. Sections 1832–39 of the 
Espionage Act give an example of a criminal legislative framework that offers a 
proper balance between the protection of confidential information and public 
policy. Criminal law requires a high level of intent; therefore, only those 
unauthorized individuals and organizations that intended to take information 
known to be confidential would be in violation of these provisions. This scheme 
offers many benefits beyond the predominant tort law approach. Given the 
resources of the federal government and the investigative powers of its key 
agencies, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, it is likely that more 
instances of industrial espionage will be brought to the courts’ attention. 
Combined with severe criminal penalties, such an approach would likely 
provide the necessary deterrence that Canadian law currently lacks. 
